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Symposium
Presidential Power in the Obama Administration:
Early Reflections
"A NEW ERA OF OPENNESS?":
DISCLOSING INTELLIGENCE TO
CONGRESS UNDER OBAMA
Kathleen Clark*

As a candidate, Barack Obama promised ((a neHJ era
of openness," and his administration has taken some
significant steps to increase transparency in the executive
branch. But it has also continued the Bush
administration's policy of invoking the state secrets
privilege to avoid judicial scrutiny of controversial
warrantless surveillance and torture programs. Many
commentators have noted the parallels between the Bush
and Obama policies on disclosing sensitive information
to courts, but they have paid little attention to whether the
Obama
administration
has
continued
Bush
administration policies regarding the disclosure of
sensitive information to Congress.
This Essay fills that gap, and looks in detail at the Bush
and Obama Administration responses to legislative
proposals for expanding intelligence disclosures to
Congress.
It reviews the Bush and Obama
Administration positions on legislation that would
require intelligence disclosure to Congress, and finds that
there are substantial similarities- though not identity
between the Bush and Obama Administration
approaches. Both Administrations have opposed
disclosure of covert actions to the full intelligence
*
Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. kathleen@wustl.edu. I
am grateful to Steven Aftergood, William Banks, Loch Johnson, Daniel Keating, Heidi
Kitrosser, Peter Margulies, and Chris Wells for their comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
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committees and the disclosure of internal executive
branch legal advice. On these most sensitive intelligence
issues, we will see increased disclosure to Congress only
over the objection of President Barack Obama.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration came into office with great
expectations for increased transparency. As a candidate, Barack
Obama promised "a new era of openness," pledging that he
would "restore the balance we've lost between the necessarily
secret and the necessity of openness in a democratic society."1
On his first full day in office, he issued memoranda proclaiming
that his "Administration is committed to creating an
unprecedented level of openness in Government,"2 directing the
Attorney General to issue new guidelines to agency heads about
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), "reaffirming the
commitment to accountability and transparency,"3 and an
executive order on presidential records, reversing the George W.
Bush executive order that permitted the heirs of deceased
former Presidents to invoke constitutional privileges and prevent
disclosure.4 Since then, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a
memorandum reversing John Ashcroft's 2001 FOIA
memorandum, and indicating that the Justice Department would
defend nondisclosure only if disclosure will harm "an interest
protected by one of the statutory exemptions . . . or [if]
disclosure is prohibited by law."5 The Justice Department
released long-sought legal memoranda about the CIA's torture
program,6 and the Office of Management and Budget directed
1. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks on Fifth Anniversary of Speech Opposing the
Iraq War (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/02/on_fifth_
anniversary_of_speech.php.
2. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 2009 DAILY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 10 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/
DCPD200900010.pdf.
3. Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 2009 DAILY COMP PRES.
Doc. 9 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/
DCPD200900009. pdf.
4. Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009); Exec. Order No.
13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001).
5. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies 2 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/ag_
foia_memo2009-03-19.pdf. The Ashcroft memorandum pledged to defend all decisions
not to disclose "unless they lack a sound legal basis." Memorandum from Attorney Gen.
John Ashcroft to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/01 1012.htm.
6. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell Out Brutal CI.A. Mode of
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executive branch agencies to make high value data sets freely
available on the web.7
But the Obama Administration has disappointed open
government advocates by opposing efforts to hold accountable
those involved in several controversial Bush Administration
intelligence programs: warrantless surveillance, torture and
extraordinary rendition. President Obama personally opposes a
proposed truth commission to investigate the interrogation and
warrantless surveillance programs, 8 preferring to look forward
rather than backward.9 Obama personally intervened and
reversed a Justice Department decision to abide by an appellate
court decision that the FOIA requires the government to release
photographs of U.S. military personnel abusing prisoners in Iraq
and Afghanistan.10 Instead, the executive branch sought
Supreme Court review of that decision, and while the case was
pending, convinced Congress to revise FOIA in order to avoid
11
disclosure.
In a move that has received much attention in the press and
blogosphere, the Obama Administration has favored secrecy
over transparency to avoid judicial scrutiny of the Bush
Administration's warrantless surveillance and torture policies.12
Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.

com/2009/04/17/us/politics/17 detain.html.
7. See, e.g., Data.gov, www.data.gov/about (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) ("The
purpose of Data.gov is to increase public access to high value, machine readable datasets
generated by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government."); USAspending.gov,
www.usaspending.gov (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) (providing information about
government contracts).
8. President's Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration,
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 388 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900388.pdf.
9. David Johnston Charlie Savage, Obama Signals His Reluctance To Investigate
Bush
Programs,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
12,
2009,
at Al,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/12/us/politics/12inquire.html (quoting then-President
elect Obama as stating that "we need to look forward as opposed to looking
backwards").
10. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't. of Def., 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated,
130 S. Ct. 777 (2009); Jeff Zeleny & Thom Shankar, Obama Reversal on Abuse Photos,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/
l 4/us/politics/l 4photos.html.
11. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
1 1 1-83, § 565, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009) (amending FOIA by granting the Secretary of
Defense the discretion to withhold the release of photographs of prisoners being
abused). In light of this Act, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision.
Dep't of Def. v. ACLU, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
12. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2009, at Al2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/world/americas/
lOiht-lOtorture.20065435.html; Glenn Greenwald, Op-Ed., The 180-Degree Reversal of
Obama's State Secrets Position, SALON.COM, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.salon.com/
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Although the Administration instituted new internal executive
branch procedures for invoking the state secrets privilege, it has
not changed the executive branch's stance in court. In lawsuit
after lawsuit seeking redress for the Bush Administration's
warrantless surveillance and torture policies, the Obama
Administration has argued that the state secrets doctrine
requires courts to dismiss these cases, using the same arguments
(and even nearly identical affidavits) as the Bush
Administration.13 On the question of whether courts can serve as
an accountability mechanism for controversial intelligence
policies, there is little difference between the positions of the
Obama and George W. Bush Administrations.14
While the parallels between the Bush and Obama policies
regarding the disclosure of sensitive information to courts has
received a great deal of attention, less attention has been given
to how the Obama Administration compares with the Bush
Administration in disclosing sensitive information to Congress.
This Essay examines the Obama and Bush Administration
policies toward disclosing intelligence-related information to
15
Congress.
To make such a comparison, one would ideally compare the
quantity and quality of intelligence information that each
Administration actually disclosed to Congress. But when the
executive branch discloses this information to Congress, it
generally provides it only to the intelligence committees in
secret, and the committees keep that information secret.16 The
lack of publicly available data about the actual information
disclosed to Congress makes it impossible to perform that kind
of comparison.
opinion/greenwald/2009/02/10/obama/.
13. Schwartz, supra note 12.
14. For a discussion of various accountability mechanisms, see Kathleen Clark, The
Architecture of Accountability: The Case of Warrantless Surveillance, 2010 BYU L. REV.
(forthcoming).
15. Confidential disclosure of information to congressional intelligence committees
does not, of course, constitute "openness." Yet widening the circle of disclosure, even
within government, may help achieve accountability through the checking function of
elected representatives, if not through the involvement of the public, at large.
Conversely, restricting disclosures, even within government, can and does hinder
accountability. The facially inadequate Justice Department legal memoranda justifying
torture and warrantless surveillance could remain viable only through tightly limiting
their distribution, even within government. See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by
the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 455, 462 (2005)
[hereinafter Clark, Ethical Issues]; Clark, supra note 14.
16. See L. BRITT SNIDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: CIA'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH CONGRESS, 1946-2004, at 1 15 (2008).
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What is publicly available, however, is information about
the Bush and Obama Administrations' positions on proposed
legislation that would require increased intelligence disclosure to
Congress. In every year since the New York Times's December
2005 revelation that the Bush Administration had engaged in
warrantless surveillance,17 members of Congress have introduced
legislation to increase intelligence disclosures to Congress, and
the executive branch has expressed a position on that legislation.
By looking in detail at those proposed legislative measures and
the executive branch's positions on them, it becomes apparent
that the Obama Administration has, to a significant degree,
continued the Bush Administration secrecy regime.
II. DISCLOSING INTELLIGENCE TO CONGRESS
Up until the mid-1970s, the executive branch disclosed to
Congress little information about intelligence operations, and
Congress performed little oversight of the intelligence agencies.18
In 1975, the Senate and House convened ad hoc investigatory
committees to examine intelligence abuses.19 Those committees
held extensive hearings and wrote reports about the intelligence
agencies.20 As a result of those ad hoc investigations, both
Chambers established permanent committees tasked with
intelligence oversight.21 In 1980, Congress passed legislation
requiring the executive branch to keep the congressional
intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of
intelligence activities.22

17. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
18. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-1994 ( 2d ed. 1994) ; SNIDER, supra note 16, at 94-103;
LOCH K. JOHNSON, SEASON QF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION
( 1985) .
19. The Senate created a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities and the House Select Intelligence Committee. In
February 1975, the House created a committee chaired by Rep. Lucien Nedzi, but that
committee was beset with problems. In July 1975, the House disbanded that committee
and created a new committee chaired by Rep. Otis Pike. CECIL V. CRABB & PAT M.
HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT & FOREIGN POLICY
172-75 ( 2d ed. 1984) .
20. Id.
21. The Senate created the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976. S. Res.
400, 94th Cong., 94 CONG. REC. 4754 ( 1976) . The House created the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence in 1977. H. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 95 CONG. REC. 22,932
( 1977) .
22. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407,
94 Stat. 1975, 1981 ( codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2006)) .
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Congress enacted a special- more limited- notification
process for covert actions (defined as government activities
intended "to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly"23).
For covert actions, Congress permitted prior notice to be limited
to just eight members of Congress (rather than the full
intelligence committees) where "the President determines it is
essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinar�
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States." 4
This small subset of legislators 1s referred to as the "gang of
eight:" the chairs and ranking members25 of the intelligence
committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the
Senate.26 Since 1980, Presidents have used this "gang of eight"
procedure to notify Congress of covert actions.21
While the statutory "gang of eight" procedure applies only
to covert actions (as opposed to other intelligence activities, such
as intelligence collection), the George W. Bush Administration
23. Congress enacted this statutory definition of "covert action" in 1991.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. 102-88, § 503( e) , 105 Stat.
429, 442 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006)). The statutory definition of
"covert activities" specifically excludes "activities the primary purpose of which is to
acquire intelligence." Id.
24. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450
§ 50l(a)(l)(B), 94 Stat. 1975, 1 981 (1980). The Act does not explicitly require the
executive branch to provide the intelligence committees with prior notification of covert
actions, but refers to covert actions as "significant anticipated intelligence activity," id. §
501 (a)(1) (emphasis added), and the Act's two mentions of "prior notice" seem to
assume that prior notice is generally required, id. See also S. REP. No. 96-730, at 4 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192, 4194 (noting that the legislation repeals the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment's requirement that the executive branch report covert actions
to Congress "in a timely fashion," and asserting that it replaced that provision with a
requirement that the intelligence committees be given prior notice of covert actions);
SNIDER, supra note 16, at 59-60 (noting that the legislation "contemplated [that the
intelligence committees] would be advised in advance" of covert actions).
25. On the Senate Intelligence Committee, the ranking member (i.e., minority
member with the most seniority) serves as Vice-Chair of the Committee. S. Res. 400,
94th Cong., 94 CONG. REC. 4754 (1976).
26. Alfred Cumming, Cong. Research Serv., " Gang of Four" Congressional
Intelligence Notifications (2010), available at http:// assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40698_
20100129.pdf.
27. But see HOUSE SELECT COMM. To INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS
TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN & SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP.
No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, at 4-5 (1987). (President Reagan failed to notify even the "gang
of eight" of the covert action to sell arms to Iran, and Congress learned of the sale only
after it was revealed in a Lebanese newspaper).
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used the "gang of eight" procedure to inform Congress of its
warrantless surveillance and torture programs.28 After the
program was disclosed in the New York Times, some members
of the intelligence committees who had not been part of the
"gang of eight" expressed anger that they had not been
informed.29 Democratic members of the "gang of eight" were put
on the defensive for not having done more to oppose the
program, but protested that secrecr prevented them from taking
any action to oppose the program.3
Of particular concern was whether the surveillance program
was even legal. Prior to disclosure of the program in the New
York Times, at least one member of the "gang of eight" privately
expressed concern about its legality.31 After its disclosure, several
congressional committees sought- but were denied- access to
the Justice Department memoranda that provided the legal
justification for the program.32
In response to these controversial Bush Administration
intelligence policies and its practice of notifying only the "gang
of eight," some members of Congress proposed legislation to
ensure broader intelligence disclosure to the intelligence
committees. In each of the four years following the New York
Times disclosure of the surveillance program, members of
Congress introduced intelligence authorization bills that would
have increased intelligence disclosure to Congress. The next
Pamela Hess, Michael Hayden: Congress Was Informed About Surveillance
BUFFINGTON POST, July 11, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/07/l l/michael-hayden-congress-w_n_230066.html; Cumming, supra note 26.
29. Sen. Russell Feingold introduced a resolution to censure President Bush for
"his failure to inform the full congressional intelligence committees as required by law."
S. Res. 398, 109th Cong., 109 CONG. REC. S2041 (2006).
30. Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed., The Gap in Intelligence Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
2006, at B7 (defending her failure to object to warrantless surveillance); Glenn Thrush &
John Bresnahan, Pelosi Defense: Couldn't Object in '03, POLITICO, May 11, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22401.html (providing Pelosi's defense for her
failure to object to torture); Rep. Jane Harmon, Jane Harman Comments on the Release
of
Bush's
Law
by
Eric
Lichtblau,
TPM,
Mar.
31,
2008,
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/03/31/j ane _harman_comments_on_the _re/;
Shane
Harris,
The
CIA
Briefing
Game,
NAT'L.
J., June 6, 2009,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20090606_4885.php.
31. Letter from Senator Jay Rockefeller, Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence , to Vice President Cheney (July 17 , 2003) , available at
http://www. glo balsecuri ty .org/in tell/library/news/2005/in tell-051219-rockefellerOl
.pdf.
32. See, e.g. , Letter from Representative John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, Office of the
Counsel to
the President (Feb. 12, 2008),
available
at
http://www.
themediaconsortium.com/reporting/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/conyers080212.pdf
(seeking access to legal memoranda relating to the warrantless surveillance program).
28.

Program,

r
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Section identifies the intelligence disclosure provisions of the
intelligence authorization bills for fiscal years ("FY") 2007 to
2010, and examines the Bush and Obama Administration
positions on those provisions.
To make this comparison, I reviewed the official Bush and
Obama Administration positions on the intelligence
authorization bills from FY 2007 to 2010,33 identified executive
branch objections to requirements for intelligence disclosure to
Congress, determined whether that provision had been proposed
during both the Bush Administration (FY 2007, 2008 or 2009)
and the Obama Administration (FY 2010),34 and then examined
33. E.g. , OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2701-INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2010
(July
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=86389 [hereinafter FY 2010 SAP].
This approach-examining Statements of Administration Policy and veto messages
regarding intelligence authorization bills-is under-inclusive in two ways. First, it does
not reach intelligence-related provisions that were included in other legislation, but not
the intelligence authorization bills. See, e.g., S. Res. 3501 , 110th Cong., 110 CONG. REC.
S8861 (2008) (requiring the executive branch to report to Congress if it issues an opinion
indicating that a statute does not constrain executive branch action). Second, it does not
reach other communications of administration position, such as official testimony or
informal statements regarding pending legislation. See, e. g., Letter from Michael
Mukasey, Attorney Gen., to Senator Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Nov. 14,
2008), available athttp://www. justice.gov/olc/2008/olc-reporting-act.pdf.
34. Information disclosure provisions that appeared during only the Bush
Administration or only the Obama Administration could not become the basis for
comparison between the two Administrations. Examples of provisions that were
proposed during either the Bush or Obama Administrations, but not both, include
provisions that would:
require a report to Congress on "intelligence activities related to the overthrow
of a democratically elected government" in the previous ten years, Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, 1 10th Cong. § 503 (2007);
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2082 - INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/12/sap121 107.pdf [hereinafter FY 2008 SAP];
allow the disclosure of non-covert action-related information to the full
committees if the Chair and ranking member agree, Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, 110th Cong. § 502 (2008); OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 5959 - INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2009
(2008),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb .edu/ws/index. php?pid= 77656 [hereinafter FY 2009
SAP];
require that each member of the intelligence committees be notified of the fact
that only the Chair and ranking member were given full information regarding
non-covert action-related information, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007, s. 372, 1 10th Cong. § 304 (2007); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
POLICY: S. 372 - INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FY 2007 (2007) ,
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25593&st=
•

•
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whether the Bush and Obama Administrations took the same
position on the intelligence disclosure provisions that had been
proposed during both Administrations. While none of these
provisions has been enacted into law,35 the debate over them lays
bare the executive branch's position on intelligence disclosures
to Congress, and shows substantial similarities- though not
identity- between the Bush and Obama positions.
III. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED INTELLIGENCE
DISCLOSURE
Each of the intelligence authorization bills from FY 2007 to
2010 includes provisions for increased intelligence disclosure to
Congress. There were repeated attempts to require disclosure of
legal advice related to intelligence activities and disclosure of
covert actions beyond the chair and ranking members of the
intelligence committees.36
A. DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL OPINIONS
Perhaps due to the controversy surrounding the Bush
Administration's legal memoranda supporting torture,37 in every
year since 2005, Congress included in its intelligence
authorization bills provisions requiring the executive branch to
disclose its legal opinions to Congress.38 The Bush and Obama
Administrations consistently opposed these provisions.

&stl= [hereinafter FY 2007 SAP];
require disclosure of intelligence information to the Government
Accountability Office, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
H.R. 2701, l l l th Cong. § 335 (2009); FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33.
See infra Appendix B.
35. The last intelligence authorization bill to become law was for FY 2005. See
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-487, 118 Stat. 3939 (2004).
Congress passed an intelligence authorization bill for FY 2008, but President Bush
vetoed the bill. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008-VETO
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. Doc. No. 110-100), 154
CONG. REC. Hl419-20 (2008).
36. For a summary of the information disclosure provisions and the Bush and
Obama Administrations' positions on these provisions, see infra Appendix A.
37. The Bush Administration's August 1, 2002 legal opinion was leaked in The
Washington Post in June 2004. David Ignatius, Op-Ed., Small Com.fort, WASH. POST,
June 15, 2004, at A23. For a discussion of the ensuing ethical controversies, see Clark,
Ethical Issues, supra note 15.
38. A review of the intelligence authorization bills from FY 2001 to FY 2010
indicates that the requirement to disclose legal opinions appeared for the first time in
2005 (the year after revelation of the torture opinion) in the FY 2006 bill. Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, S. 1803, 109th Cong. § 107 (2005). This same
provision reappeared in identical form in the FY 2007 bill. S. 372, § 108.
•
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A provision in the FY 2007 intelligence authorization bill
would have required disclosure of intelligence-related legal
opinions to Congress, but permitted the executive branch to
avoid disclosure, as long as the President asserted a
constitutional privilege.39 This provision was rather modest,
permitting nondisclosure upon mere invocation of a
constitutional privilege (rather than adjudication of its
applicability). But the Bush Administration opposed it, arguing
that it "would foster political gamesmanship and elevate routine
disagreements to the level of constitutional crises."40
Another provision, requiring disclosure to Congress of legal
advice regarding the meaning of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, as applied to interrogation techniques, was narrower in
scope, but did not include an automatic exception upon
invocation of a privilege.41 The Bush Administration opposed
this disclosure requirement, contending that it "rais[ es] grave
constitutional issues."42 President Bush referred to this provision
when he vetoed the FY 2008 intelligence authorization bill,
contending that "questions concerning access to such
information are best addressed through the customary practices
and arrangements between the executive and legislative
branches on such matters, rather than through the enactment of
legislation."43
39. S. 372, § 508 (requiring the disclosure of information "unless the President
certifies that such document or information is not being provided because the President
is asserting a privilege pursuant to the Constitution of the United States"). While the bill
did not define "privilege pursuant to the Constitution," it presumably would include the
state secrets privilege.
40. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34.
41. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, 110th Cong.
§ 326 (2007); S. 372, § 313. The FY 2008 bill also required disclosure of legal advice
related to the meaning of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, as applied to
interrogation techniques. H.R. 2082, § 326.
42. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.
43. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008- VETO
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. Doc. No. 110-100), 154
CONG. REC. H1419, 1420 (2008); see also FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34. The Statement of
Administration Policy ("SAP") for FY 2007 made a similar policy argument regarding
this provision: that this is a "matter[] . . . appropriately left to sensitive handling in the
normal course between the intelligence committees and the executive branch and should
not be the subject of detailed statutory reporting requirements. " FY 2007 SAP, supra
note 34.
The Obama Administration has not been faced with this particular legislative
proposal, and so it is not clear what its position on it would be. On the one hand, in April
2009, the Obama Administration released to the public several Bush Administration
legal opinions regarding interrogation techniques. See Mazzetti & Shane, supra note 6.
(These released opinions would not have been covered by the FY 2007 and FY 2008 bills
because they were issued before enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.) On
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A broader provision, requiring the disclosure to Congress of
information about the legal status of intelligence and operations,
including dissenting views, appeared in the FY 2009 and FY 2010
bills.44 Both the Bush and Obama Administrations opposed this
provision,45 and the Obama Administration even issued a veto
threat based on this disclosure requirement.46 While the Obama
Administration has been willing to disclose some of the
controversial Bush Administration legal opinions justifying
torture,47 it, like the Bush Administration before it, has chafed at
the prospect of a statutory requirement to disclose its legal
opinions.
B. DISCLOSURE OF COVERT ACTIONS BEYOND THE
"GANG OF EIGHT"

The Bush and Obama Administrations also both opposed
disclosure of covert actions to the full intelligence committees.
The FY 2007 bill required the executive branch to notify the full
intelligence committees of covert actions, or at least notify the
full committees of the fact that they were not being fully
informed and why.48 That bill would also withhold all funding for
any intelligence activity (including covert actions) on which the
executive branch had not followed that mandate.49 The Bush
Administration objected to these provisions, noting that they
"may require broader dissemination of the very facts that
require limited access."50 The Administration also contended

the other hand, the Obama Administration opposes legislation that would require the
disclosure of information about the legal status of intelligence collection operations and
covert actions, including dissenting views. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, H.R. 2701, l l lth,Cong. § 321 (2009).
44. H.R. 2701 , § 321; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R.
5959, l lOth Cong. § 502 (2008).
45. The Bush Administration indicated that this provision "would undermine long
standing arrangements between Congress and the President regarding reporting of
sensitive intelligence matters." FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. The Obama
Administration also opposed this provision. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1 ("[This
provision] raises serious constitutional concerns by amending sections 501-503 of the
National Security Act of 1947 in ways that would raise significant executive privilege
concerns by purporting to require the disclosure of internal Executive branch legal
advice and deliberations. Administrations of both political parties have long recognized
the importance of protecting the confidentiality of the Executive Branch's legal advice
and deliberations.").
46. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1.
47. See Mazzetti & Shane, supra note 6.
48. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 372, l lOth Cong. § 304
(2007).
49. Id. § 307.
50. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.

324

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:313

that this "all-or-nothing approach to executive branch
notification to the intelligence committees . . . would
discourage, rather than encourage, the sharing of
,, i
extraordinarily sensitive information. s
The FY 2009 intelligence authorization bill did not directly
require such disclosure, but used Congress's control over
appropriations as a lever to pressure the executive branch to
make such disclosure. It would have withheld funding of 75% of
the intelligence budget until covert actions are reported to the
full intelligence committees. 2s The Bush Administration opposed
this provision, arguing that it
would undermine the fundamental compact between the
Congress and the President on reporting highly sensitive
intelligence matters- an arrangement that for decades has
balanced congressional oversight responsibility with the need
to protect intelligence information. Questions concerning
access to such information are best addressed through the
customary practices and arrangements, rather than through
s3
enactment of contradictory legislation.

The FY 2010 bill would delete the statutory "gang of eight"
notification procedure for covert actions, and create a default
rule that the President must notify the full intelligence
committees of covert actions. s4 Narrower notification would be
permitted only if the intelligence committees establish written
procedures indicating that not all members of the committees
must be notified. ss This new default position would have the
effect of transferring power that is now in the hands of the
intelligence committee chairs and ranking members over to the
full committee membership, who for decades have been
excluded from information about covert actions (and, during the
Bush Administration, were excluded from information about
questionable intelligence policies). Only if the full committee
establishes a new written rule for more limited disclosure would
the full committee be excluded from notifications of covert
actions. The Obama Administration opposes this new default
rule for covert action notification, threatening a veto of a bill
51. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.
52. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, 1 10th Cong.
§ 105 (2008) (proposing to withhold funding for 75% of the National Intelligence
Program).
53. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.
54. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, l llth Cong.
§ 321 (2009).
55. Id.
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containing it.56 In explaining its opposition, the Obama
Administration invokes some of the same arguments- and
language- used by the Bush Administration: the proposed
changes would undermine what the executive branch refers to as
a "fundamental compact between the Congress and the
President" regarding the reporting of intelligence activities, "an
arrangement that for decades has balanced congressional
oversight responsibilities with the President's responsibility to
protect sensitive national security information."57
C. OTHER DISCLOSURE-RELATED PROVISIONS
Regarding several other disclosure requirements, the
Obama Administration position is different from that of the
Bush Administration. The Bush Administration consistently
opposed the creation of an Inspector General ("IG") for the
intelligence community,58 arguing that such a position was
unnecessary59 and "inconsistent with the preservation of the
authority of heads of departments and agencies over their
respective departments and agencies" established in the post9/11
intelligence
reform
legislation.60
The
Obama
Administration's stance on the creation of this new IG is
ambivalent. While not opposing it as such, the Administration
indicated that some provisions may need to be changed.61
The legislative provision that would create a new IG would
also set out specific procedures for intelligence community
employees who blow the whistle on wrongdoing.62 As indicated
56. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1.
57. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1. The FY 2009 SAP similarly contended that a
provision for disclosure of covert actions to the full committees "would undermine the
.fundamental compact between the Congress and the President on reporting highly
sensitive intelligence matters - an arrangement that for decades has balanced
congressional oversight responsibility with the need to protect intelligence inf. ormation."
FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (emphasis added).
58. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 ("The Administration has consistently
opposed the creation of an IG/IC in prior bills.").
59. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 ("The existing inspectors general of the
departments with elements in the IC, and the Central Intelligence Agency, are best
suited to perform the necessary investigative, inspection, and audit functions. There is no
need to spend additional taxpayer resources to provide for two inspectors general with
competing jurisdiction over the same intelligence elements.").
60. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34.
61. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2 (indicating that the Administration "supports
the important work undertaken by Inspectors General . . . and would like to work with
the Congress on the optimal approach and authorities for carrying out the important
functions of Inspectors General in the context of the IC").
62. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, lllth Cong.
§ 406 (2009); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, llOth Cong.
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above, the Bush Administration opposed the larger IG
provision. By implication, the Bush Administration may have
also opposed this �hist�eblower provisioi:, but i�s gublic
.
statements of oppos1t10n
did not focus on wh1stleblowmg. - The
Obama Administration has taken an explicit-if somewhat
ambivalent- position on this whistleblower provision. It
supports the expansion of protections for intelligence
whistleblowers, but expresses concern that the bill could be
interpreted "to constrain the President's constitutional authority
to review and, if appropriate, control disclosure of certain
classified information."64 The Obama Administration has
pledged to "work[] closely with Senate and House staff to craft
appropriate whistleblower enhancement protections for
intelligence community whistleblowers [so that these provisions]
address constitutional and other concerns."65
The Bush Administration also opposed a requirement that
the CIA IG audit covert actions every three years and report to
Congress on his findings. Its objections were two-fold: it "would
interfere with the independent judgment of the CIA Inspector
General or Director of the CIA as to what activities should be
audited and when the audits should be conducted,"66 and
"conflict[] with the President's authority to control the
dissemination of classified information."67 When this same
provision appeared in the FY 2010 bill, the Obama
Administration did not object to it.68
Finally, the Bush Administration also objected to a
requirement that the executive branch report to the intelligence
committees on "the use of personal service contracts across the
§ 408 (2008); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, l lOth Cong.
§ 413 (2007); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 372, l lOth Cong. §
408 (2007).

63. The FY 2008 SAP expressed opposition to the IG provision, which included
specific procedures for intelligence whistleblowers. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34. But its
stated opposition to this provision did not mention whistleblowing. See FY 2008 SAP,
supra note 34.
64. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2.
65. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2.
66. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.
67. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2; see also FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34 (same
objection). The Bush Administration also indicated that the disclosure requirement
conflicts with other statutory provisions allowing the CIA Director to prevent disclosures
from the CIA IG to Congress, and runs counter to "long-standing arrangements between
the Executive and Legislative branches regarding the transmittal of information about
sensitive intelligence programs." FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.
68. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, l l lth Cong.
§ 411 (2009).
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intelligence community," including a comparison of their
compensation levels with government employees performing
similar functions, and their use in covert actions, rendition,
detention and interrogation.69 The Bush Administration
contended that this provision would "violate[] long-standing
arrangements regarding the release of classified information
concerning highly sensitive national security matters such as
intelligence collection, analysis, and covert actions."70 The
Obama Administration expressed no objection to this contractor
report requirement in the FY 2010 bill.71
IV. CONCLUSION
To a limited degree, the Obama Administration has broken
from the Bush Administration's practice of opposing nearly all
requirements to disclose intelligence to Congress. Unlike the
Bush Administration, the Obama Administration does not
object to reporting on intelligence contractors, regular audits of
covert actions, or the creation of an Inspector General for the
intelligence community.
But the Obama Administration has continued the Bush
Administration practice of resisting robust intelligence
disclosure to Congress. It objects to whistleblower protections
that "could be understood to constrain the President's
constitutional authority to . . . control disclosure of certain
classified information."72 Even more significantly, it opposes
requirements to disclose legal advice and to disclose covert
actions beyond the "gang of eight."73
From a historical perspective, the Obama Administration's
opposition to these measures is nothing new. For decades,
Presidents have claimed the right to control classified

69. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, l lOth Cong.
§ 306 (2008); see also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082,
110th Cong. § 307 (2007) (containing similar language).
70. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34. The FY 2008 SAP also objected to this provision,
but only because "there [was] insufficient time to prepare and coordinate the report by
the . . . due date." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 3.
71. H.R. 2701, § 338; FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33.
72. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2.
73. The Obama Administration has also objected to a new provision that would
require disclosure to Congress's investigative arm, the Government Accountability
Office. H.R. 2701, § 335; Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget,
to Senator Diane Feinstein, Chairwoman, Select Comm. on Intelligence (Mar. 15, 2010),
available athttp://www. fas.org/irp/news/2010/03/omb031610.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
Peter R. Orszag].
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information and internal legal advice. They have also resisted
the disclosure of covert actions. In fact, when Congress enacted
the statutory "gang of eight" procedure in 1980, that provision
had the effect of narrowing (rather than expanding) the
disclosure of covert action because the predecessor Hughes
Ryan Amendment required disclosure of covert actions to eight
congressional committees, rather than eight members of
Congress.7 4
Obama's vehement opposition to disclosing covert actions
beyond the "gang of eight" - even threatening a veto- is
particularly troubling because the "gang of eight" procedure
provides only the appearance- rather than the reality- of a
congressional check on covert actions. Congress is a collective
body, and eight members cannot, by themselves, pass any
legislation to stop or limit particular covert actions. "Gang of
eight" notification inoculates the executive branch from later
political backlash because the executive branch can- and does
point to Congress's inaction as congressional endorsement of the
covert action.75
It is heartening that the Obama Administration has not
made the same extreme claims of executive secrecy as its
immediate predecessor. But on two issues that are key to
retaining executive power- keeping its internal legal advice
secret and limiting disclosure of covert actions to only eight
members of Congress- the Obama Administration not only
expressed opposition, but issued a rare veto threat to a Congress
controlled by its own party.76

74. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804-05
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)) (requiring disclosure of covert actions
to "the appropriate committees of the Congress," which included the House and Senate
Intelligence, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees); see
William E. Conner, Congressional Reform of Covert Action Oversight Following the Iran
Contra Affair, 2 DEF. INTELLIGENCE J. 35 , 41 (1993).
75. Kathleen Clark, Congress's Right To Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 201 1); SNIDER, supra note 16, at 311 (stating that if a covert
action "is disclosed or ends in disaster, the administration will want to have had Congress
on board"); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security
Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1058-59 (2008).
76. President Obama has also threatened a veto regarding another provision that is
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight: the
requirement to disclose intelligence information to the Government Accountability
Office in support of congressional intelligence oversight. H.R. 2701, § 335. The Obama
Administration objects to this provision, contending that it would "undermine th[e]
special relationship between the IC [intelligence community] and the congressional
intelligence committees." Letter from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 73.
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Candidate Barack Obama's rhetoric led to high
expectations for a "new era of openness." But his
Administration's response to proposed intelligence legislation
tells a different story. We will see increased disclosure to
Congress on the most sensitive intelligence issues only over the
objection of President Barack Obama.
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APPENDIX A
INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS PROPOSED
DURING BOTH THE BUSH AND OBAMA
ADMINISTRATIONS
FY

FY

2008

2007

Provision

FY

2009

FY

2010

t:d
::::::

H.R.

H.R.

H.R.

2082

5959

2701

i

N

N

N

0ii

§ 313

iii

§ 326 v

N

N

av

N

N

§ 502

§ 321

ovi

N

N

N

§ 321

S.372

[fl

::::r

0
cr'

p;

8

p;

Disclosure of legal advice:

Disclose legal
opinions to intelligence committees, or
any other committee
with jurisdiction over
the subject matter,
unless President
asserts a constitutional privilege.
Disclose legal advice
regarding the meaning
of the Detainee
Treatment Act of
2005, as applied to
interrogation
techniques.
Disclose information
about the legal status
of intelligence
operations, including
dissenting views.
Disclose information
about the legal status
of covert actions,
including dissenting
views.

§ 108

i

aviii

Covert action disclosures beyond chair & ranking member:

If full information is
not given to the full
committees, then, at
least, notify each
member of that fact &
why.

§ 304

N

N

N

ovii

oix
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Provision

2007
S.372

FY

2008

FY

2009

FY

2010

H.R.

H.R.

H.R.

2082

5959

2701

331
bj
�

rJJ

I:;'

0
cr'
Pl

i3

Pl

Deny funding for any
intelligence activity,
unless full committees
have been informed
of it, or have, at least,
been notified that
they were not
informed.

§ 307

N

N

N

ox

Deny funding for 75%
of the "National
Intelligence Program"
until covert actions
are reported to full
committees.

N

N

§ 105

N

oxi

Delete the statutory
"gang of eight"
notification for covert
actions. The President
can notify less than
the full committee of
covert actions only if
that committee's
written procedures
indicate that the
committee
"determines that not
all members of that
committee are
required to have
access to a finding."

N

N

N

§ 321

§ 408

§ 413

§ 408

§ 406

a xiii

xi v

§ 408

§ 413

§ 408

§ 406

o xv

+ xvi
O S

oxii

Other provisions:

Create Inspector
General for the
intelligence
community.
Create specific procedures for whistleblowers who reveal
information to intelligence committees.
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Provision

2007

FY

2009

FY

2010

H.R.

H.R.

H.R.

2082

5959

2701

N

§ 423

§ 421

N

§ 307

§ 306

S.372

Require audit of
covert actions every 3
years and report to
Congress.
Require extensive
report on use of
personal service contractors in Intelligence
Community.

FY

2008

N = no equivalent provision in this bill
0 =administration opposed this provision
S =administration supported this provision
-- =administration silent on this provision
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0

er
p;

P"'

s

§ 411

oxvii

-

§ 328

oxviii

--

r:n

p;

-
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APPENDIX B
INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS PROPOSED
DURING EITHER BUSH OR OBAMA
ADMINISTRATIONS (BUT NOT BOTH)
FY

Provision

2007
S . 372

FY

2008

H.R.
2082

FY

2009

H.R.
5959

FY

2010

H.R.

t:;d
i=

Cfl

µ

2701

Non-covert action disclosure beyond chair & rankin� member:

not given to the full
least, notify each

§ 304

N

N

N

oxix

§ 307

N

N

N

oxx

N

§ 328

N

N

axxi

N

N

§ 502

N

oxxii

member of that fact &

why.

Deny funding for any
intelligence activity,
unless full committees
have been informed of
it, or have at least been
notified that they were
not informed.
Deny 70% of funding
for particular intelligence program until
executive branch "fully
and currently" informs
full intelligence committees regarding a
S eptember 6, 2007

Israeli military action
against S yria.
Disclose to the full
intelligence committees
if chair & ranking
member agree.

�

s

�

If full information is

committees, then, at

0
cr'
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2007

FY

2008

FY

2009

FY
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2010

t:d
r:n

i:::

H.R.

H.R.

H.R.

::i-

N

§ 502

N

N

oxxiii

N

N

N

§ 335

S . 372

2082

5959

2701

0

cr'
p:i

s

p:i

Other provisions:

Report on "intelligence
activities related to the
overthrow of a
democratically elected
government" in

previous 10 years.
Disclose intelligence

information to the
Government
Accountability Office
in support of congressional intelligence
oversight.

oxxiv
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NOTES FOR APPENDICES
i. This provision also was found in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, S. 1803, 109th Cong. § 107 (2005); see also S. REP. No. 109-142 (2005).
ii. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (" [The provision] would foster political
gamesmanship and elevate routine disagreements to the level of constitutional crises.").
iii. Section 313 of S. 372 would require disclosure of "all legal opinions" provided
by the Department of Justice regarding the "meaning or application of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 with respect to the detention and interrogation activities"
undertaken by any element of the intelligence community. Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 372, l l Oth Cong. § 313 (2007).
iv. Section 326 of H.R. 2082 requires the executive branch to disclose to the
congressional intelligence committee: "the legal justifications of any office of the
Department of Justice about the meaning or application of the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with respect to the
detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence
community. " Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, llOth
Cong. § 326 (2007).
v. This provision "includes no exception for applicable legal privileges . . . . [and]
rais[es] grave constitutional issues." FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 1. This is a "matter[]
. . . appropriately left to sensitive handling in the normal course between the intelligence
committees and the executive branch and should not be the subject of detailed statutory
reporting requirements." FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2-3; see also INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008-VETO MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. Doc. No. 110-100), 154 CONG. REC. Hl419-20
(2008); FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (" [Q]uestions concerning access to such

information are best addressed through the customary practices and arrangements
between the executive and legislative branches on such matters, rather than through the
enactment of legislation.").
vi. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (" [T]his section would undermine long
standing arrangements between Congress and the President regarding reporting of
sensitive intelligence matters.").
vii. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1 (" [This] section raises serious constitutional
concerns by amending sections 501-503 of the National Security Act of 1947 in ways that
would raise significant executive privilege concerns by purporting to require the
disclosure of internal Executive branch legal .advice and deliberations. Administrations
of both political parties have long recognized the importance of protecting the
confidentiality of the Executive Branch's legal advice and deliberations. If the final bill
presented to the President contains this provision, the President 's senior advisors would
recommend a veto. ") (emphasis in original).
viii. See FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33.
ix. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These reporting requirements themselves

may require broader dissemination of the very facts that require limited access.").
x. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These provisions establish an all-or-nothing
approach to executive branch notification to the intelligence committees that could delay
actions needed to meet urgent national security requirements and would discourage,
rather than encourage, the sharing of extraordinarily sensitive information needed for
effective legislative-executive relations with respect to the most sensitive intelligence
matters. This provision, in practice, would seek to compel the disclosure to multiple
additional persons of sensitive national security information as to which the President
has determined that special protection must be provided.").
xi. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("Such a provision is inconsistent with the
statute that expressly authorizes limited notice to Congress in exceptional cases and
would undermine the fundamental compact between the Congress and the President on
reporting highly sensitive intelligence matters - an arrangement that for decades has
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balanced congressional oversight responsibility with the need to protect intelligence
information. Questions concerning access to such information are best addressed
through the customary practices and arrangements, rather than through enactment of
contradictory legislation.").
xii. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1 (" [This provision] undermines this
fundamental compact between the Congress and the President as embodied in Title V of
the National Security Act regarding the reporting of sensitive intelligence matters - an
arrangement that for decades has balanced congressional oversight responsibilities with
the President's responsibility to protect sensitive national security information.").
xiii. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 ("The Administration has consistently
opposed the creation of an IG/IC in prior bills."); FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 1
("The existing inspectors general of the departments with elements in the IC, and the
Central Intelligence Agency, are best suited to perform the necessary investigative,
inspection, and audit functions. There is no need to spend additional taxpayer resources
to provide for two inspectors general with competing jurisdiction over the same
intelligence elements."); FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 3 ("The existing IGs of all the
IC elements are best suited to . performing the investigation, inspection, and audit
functions, without the organizationally dysfunctional interference of an outside entity
like the proposed new IG. This provision also is inconsistent with the preservation of the
authority of heads of departments and agencies over their respective departments and
agencies so carefully preserved by the chain of command provision in the IRTPA.").
xiv. The FY 2010 SAP stated that the Obama Administration "supports the
important work undertaken by Inspectors General . . . and would like to work with the
Congress on the optimal approach and authorities for carrying out the important
functions of Inspectors General in the context of the IC. " FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at
2.
xv. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("Other provisions . . . purport to require the
President to submit information that may be constitutionally protected from disclosure,
including information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national
security, deliberative processes of the Executive, or performance of the Executive's
constitutional duties. Questions concerning access to such information are best addressed
through the customary practices and arrangements between the executive and legislative
branches on such matters, rather than through the enactment of legislation."). It is not
clear that this language refers to the whistleblower provision. It may refer to IC/IG
provision, in general.
xvi. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2 ("Although the Administration supports
section 406's expansion of the protections and limitations of the Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection Act, the Administration is concerned that the bill as drafted
could be understood to constrain the President's constitutional authority to review and, if
appropriate, control disclosure of certain classified information. Administration officials
are working closely with Senate and House staff to craft appropriate whistleblower
enhancement protections for intelligence community whistleblowers through separate
legislative vehicles, H.R. 1507 and S. 372, and urge that the whistleblower enhancement
provision in this bill account for Administration proposals offered in those contexts to
address constitutional and other concerns with the current formulation.").
xvii. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34 (" [This provision] raise[s] constitutional concerns
with regard to the President's exclusive authority to control access to national security
information."); FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("This provision would interfere with
the independent judgment of the CIA Inspector General or Director of the CIA as to
what activities should be audited and when the audits should be conducted. Further, this
provision conflicts with the President's authority to control the dissemination of
classified information, provisions in the CIA Act concerning IG activities affecting vital
national security interests, and long-standing arrangements between the Executive and
Legislative branches regarding the transmittal of information about sensitive intelligence
programs.").
xviii. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34. The FY 2008 SAP also objected to this provision,
but only because "there [was] insufficient time to prepare and coordinate the report by
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the . . . due date." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 3.
xix. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These reporting requirements themselves
may require broader dissemination of the very facts that require limited access.").
xx. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These provisions establish an all-or-nothing
approach to executive branch notification to the intelligence committees that could delay
actions needed to meet urgent national security requirements and would discourage,
rather than encourage, the sharing of extraordinarily sensitive information needed for
effective legislative-executive relations with respect to the most sensitive intelligence
matters. This provision, in practice, would seek to compel the disclosure to multiple
additional persons of sensitive national security information as to which the President
has determined that special protection must be provided.").
xxi. The FY 2008 SAP objected to this "attempt[] to use Congress' power of the
purse to circumvent the authority of the Executive Branch to control access to
extraordinarily sensitive information,'' and noted that " [i]n their conference report, the
conferees stated that reporting to the full committee is required under" 50 U.S.C. § 413a,
which requires reports of intelligence activities other than covert actions. FY 2008 SAP,
supra note 34, at 2. "The Administration respectfully disagrees with this view and urges
the Senate and the House to reject this provision." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 2.
xxii. This provision "would undermine long-standing arrangements between
Congress and the President regarding reporting of sensitive intelligence' matters." FY
2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (criticizing § 502 of H.R. 5959).
xxiii. The FY 2008 SAP asserted that " [r]eporting on any such activities, if any, is
governed by Title V of the National Security Act." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 3.
xxiv. Letter from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 73.

